[Below is an html approximation
of this document: http://scofacts.org/The-F-Motion.pdf
RCS revision info:
$Id: The-F-Motion.html,v 1.3 2006/09/29 19:33:32 al Exp $
The initial scofacts text revision was based on Michael Hanscom's
version at http://www.michaelhanscom.com/eclecticism/2003/07/the_constitutio.html.
The images came from http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/fword1.html.
This motion was later published in Constitutional
Commentary. Cite as: Eric Vanatta, The F-Motion, 21 Const. Comment. 285 (2004).
]
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DISTRICT COURT, LARIMER COUNTY, COLORADO |
FILED IN COMBINED COURTS
2003 JUL -1 PM 3:07
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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, In the Interest of: [redacted], a Child. | |
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DAVID S. KAPLAN ERIC VANATTA (#24823) |
Case Number: [redacted]
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MOTION TO DISMISS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FUCK, "FUCKER" AND "FUCKING FAG" | |
Counsel hereby asks the Court to dismiss the case at bar. He states the following:
| WORD | APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF HITS |
| Fuck | 24,900,000 |
| Fucking | 24,700,000 |
| Fucker | 735,000 |
| Mom | 9,040,000 |
| Baseball | 13,600,000 |
| Hot Dogs | 607,000 |
| Apple Pie | 308,000 |
| Chevrolet | 4,090,000 |
| Freedom of Speech | 542,000 |
| First Amendment | 933,000 |
| Unconstitutional | 691,000 |
| Sticks and Stones May
Break My Bones | 7,360 |
It is against this backdrop that we turn to the situation at hand.
Cohen at 25-26 (emphasis added)Against this perception of the constitutional policies involved, we discern certain more particularized considerations that peculiarly call for reversal of this conviction. First, the principle contended for by the State seems inherently boundless. How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgement below. For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual. Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "[o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures — and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speek foolishly and without moderation." Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-674 (1944). Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views. We have been able, as noted above, to discern little social benefit that might result from running the risk of opening the door to such grave results.
Therefore, the Court must dismiss this case.
DAVID S. KAPLAN
COLORADO STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
(signature)
______________________________
ERIC VANATTA (#24823)
Deputy State Public Defender
Certificate of Service
I certify that, on 7/1/03, the foregoing document was served by delivering __X__ mailing _____ faxing _____ it to opposing counsel.
(signature)
_______________